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DEPORTING DREAMERS AS A CRIME
AGAINST HUMANITY
William Thomas Worster*
INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the “DREAMers” (Dreamers) and their
moral claim to a right to remain in the United States and the legal
mechanisms by which such a moral right might be realized. What has not
been explored is whether their removal from the United States might
implicate international law, and, specifically, whether it would constitute a
crime against humanity. On its face, it seems to be an outrageous claim: that
deporting non-citizens from a state would be a criminal act. International law
protects a State’s ability to remove unlawfully present aliens. This is not in
debate. The argument is, however, far narrower. Specifically, the forcible,
arbitrary deportation of Dreamers with an intent to permanently remove
them from their residence, which is protected under international law, would
be criminal.
This Article will first consider the current law on the crime against
humanity of deportation. The crime, which has a considerable pedigree,
prohibits individuals from pursuing deportation of persons in certain
situations. Among the key considerations is that the crime does not only
apply to the forcible removal of citizens, but also to non-citizens in some
circumstances. The distinction is whether the person is lawfully present in
the state and that the removal is unlawful. As befitting an international crime,
both of these standards are measured by international law, not domestic law,
so whether the persons are lawfully present or their removal is unlawful
under domestic law is not determinative.
The Article then considers the case of the Dreamers. While it is true that
they do not have U.S. nationality or other authorized status, and thus a right
to remain in the United States under domestic law, they do have strong
enough ties to consider the United States their “own country,” a wider
concept than nationality. Once an individual has an “own country,” he or she
* William Thomas Worster earned a J.D. degree from Chicago-Kent College of Law at the Illinois Institute of
Technology, specializing in international and comparative law, and an LL.M. degree in Public International
Law from Leiden University. He is currently completing a Ph.D. in Public International Law at the University
of Amsterdam. William Thomas Worster is a Senior Lecturer at The Hague University of Applied Sciences in
The Hague. He teaches in the areas of public international law, international migration/refugee law, and the
law of international organizations.
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may not be arbitrarily removed from that State under international human
rights law, unless the removal can be justified as non-discriminatory,
necessary and proportionate to the risk to society. Further, under
international human rights law, permissible cases of removal are very few.
The removal of a non-criminal minor from the United States with a longstanding home there cannot be justified as necessary and proportionate.
Provided that the possible future removal was by force, in pursuit of a policy
as such, committed with intent, and that the removals were widespread and
systematic, then the removal would be a crime against humanity.
I.

BACKGROUND ON THE “DREAMERS”

Dreamers are a group of approximately 1.8 million individuals1 who do
not have authorized status to live in the United States. They were brought to
the United States as children and have lived in the United States for a
substantial period of their lives. Some Dreamers were not even aware that
they were not U.S. citizens until their status was discovered. Some only
speak English. The majority hail from Mexico, but a range of other countries
are also represented. The name “Dreamers” comes from the Development,
Relief, and Education for Aliens Minors (DREAM) Act,2 which was
introduced in 2001 but never adopted by Congress. Twenty-eight percent of
the Dreamers were under fifteen years of age at the time the policy was
announced.3
On June 15, 2012, the Obama administration decided to exercise its
prosecutorial discretion and refrain from removing Dreamers in a program
called Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).4 Formally, DACA

1
See Jeanne Batalova & Michelle Mittelstadt, Relief from Deportation: Demographic Profile of the
DREAMers Potentially Eligible under the Deferred Action Policy, FACT SHEET (Migration Pol’y Inst.,
Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2012, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/DACA-deferred-action-DREAMers;
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, Who and Where the DREAMers Are, Revised Estimates: A Demographic Profile of
Immigrants Who Might Benefit from the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action Initiative (Immigr. Pol’y Ctr.,
Washington, D.C.) Oct. 16, 2012, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/who-and-wheredreamers-are-revised-estimates.
2
See Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001);
DREAM Act, S. 729, 111th Cong. (2009); Dream Act of 2017, S. 1615, 115 Cong. (2017).
3
See Batalova & Mittelstadt, supra note 1; AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 1.
4
See Caitlin Dickerson, What Is DACA? Who Are the Dreamers? Here Are Some Answers, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/us/daca-dreamers-shutdown.html; see also Memorandum
from, Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border
Prot. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as
Children (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretionindividuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [hereinafter Napolitano].
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“confer[red] no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to
citizenship,” as “[o]nly the Congress, acting through its legislative authority,
can confer these rights.”5 If Dreamers registered as DACA recipients, then
they would have their removal deferred,6 receive social security numbers7
and employment authorization,8 and through that authorization, have the
ability to purchase health care insurance and other benefits such as access to
education and eligibility for driving licenses. DACA further enabled
registered Dreamers to travel abroad and return to the United States without
a visa (advance parole).9 The program did not include access to U.S.
citizenship10 nor did it provide access to federal welfare programs or student
financial aid,11 although some aid in cases of medical emergencies was
available.12
Individuals wishing to participate in the program would have to make an
application, provide identifying information,13 and would only qualify if they
had a degree of formal education and did not have any felony or serious
misdemeanor convictions or more than two misdemeanor convictions. DACA
status was valid for two years and could be renewed. At least 800,000 people
registered.14
On September 5, 2017, the new administration froze the DACA program and
initiated its reversal.15 The Attorney General argued that DACA had been
“effectuated by the previous administration through executive action, without
proper statutory authority and . . . after Congress’ repeated rejection of proposed
legislation that would have accomplished a similar result,” and that “[s]uch an
open-ended circumvention of immigration laws was an unconstitutional exercise

5
See NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 216 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing then-Secretary of Homeland
Security Janet Napolitano’s “DACA Memo”).
6
See id.
7
See 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(4)(vi).
8
See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(11).
9
See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5.
10
See Napolitano, supra note 4.
11
See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/archive/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last
visited May 11, 2018) [hereinafter Consideration of DACA].
12
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611(b)(1), 1621(b)(1).
13
See Consideration of DACA, supra note 11.
14
See DACA Performance Data, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20
Types/DACA/daca_performancedata_fy2017_qtr2.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2017); Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d. at
PINCITE.
15
See Dickerson, supra note 4.
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of authority by the Executive Branch.”16 New applicants and renewals are no
longer possible, although existing grants will remain valid until the normally
expired at the end of the two-year validity period. Some DACA beneficiaries
began losing their status in March 2018, and unless a new remedy is developed,
all will be phased out of the program by March 2020. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary has announced that DACA participants
will not be a deportation priority unless they commit crimes,17 but then, of
course, they would no longer be eligible for DACA anyway if they committed
crimes.18 Notwithstanding the statements of the DHS Secretary, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has already begun deportation
proceedings against non-criminal DACA recipients,19 and both former and
current acting-Directors have stated that any undocumented person will be
removed. 20On April 24, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia ruled that the decision to abolish DACA was “arbitrary and
capricious”21 and that the question of DACA’s legal authority was not the

16

See Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d. at 209.
See Carlos Ballesteros, What Happens If DACA Ends? Deporting Dreamers Won’t Be a
Priority, Homeland Secretary Says, N EWSWEEK (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/whathappens-if-daca-ends- dreamers-deported-homeland-782290 (“Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen
Nielsen insisted Tuesday that federal agencies will not prioritize deporting immigrants brought illegally
into the United States as children . . . these immigrants will remain a low priority ‘in perpetuity,’ but
noted that if any of them commit a crime, ‘we will enforce the law.’”).
18
See Napolitano, supra note 4.
19
See e.g. Jenny Jarvie, Mississippi ‘Dreamer’ Daniela Vargas Released from Detention but
Deportation Order Stands, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-mississippidreamer-20170310-story.html.
20
See Clio Chang, ICE Chief Is Having a Great Time Waging Terror Against Immigrants, SPLINTER (Jan.
31, 2018), https://splinternews.com/ice-chief-is-having-a-great-time-waging-terror-against-1822601052.
(quoting former Acting Director Thomas Homan that all unlawfully present persons in the United States should
be “worried” and “looking over their shoulders”). Thomas’s successor Acting Director Ronald Vitiello, was
proposed to replace Homan, however, his nomination was later withdrawn when the adminsitration decided to
take an even tougher stance on immigration enfrocement, see Eileen Sullivan, Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Maggie
Haberman, Seeking ‘Tougher’ Direction for ICE, Trump Withdraws His Nominee, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019)
(“‘Ron’s a good man, but we’re going in a tougher direction,’ Mr. Trump said to reporters”)
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/us/politics/ronald-vitiello-ice.html. Within days, Vitiello had annoucned
his resignation from ICE, see Dep’t Homeland Sec., Message from Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen on the
Resignation of ICE Acting Director Ronald D. Vitiello (Apr. 10, 2019) https://www.dhs.gov/
news/2019/04/10/message-secretary-kirstjen-m-nielsen-resignation-ice-acting-director-ronald-d. The agency is
now lead by his successor, Acting Director Matthew T. Albence. Albence was the author of a memorandum,
while he was head of Enforcement and Removals Operations (ERO) of ICE, in which he stated “effective
immediately, ERO officers will take enforcement action against all removable aliens encountered in the course
of their duties.” See Marcelo Rochabrun, ICE Officers Told to Take Action Against All Undocumented
Immigrants Enountered While on Duty (July 7, 2017) https://www.propublica.org/article/ice-officers-told-totake-action-against-all-undocumented-immigrants-encountered-while-on-duty.
21
See Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 215 (“The Court further concludes that, under the APA, DACA’s
rescission was arbitrary and capricious because the Department failed adequately to explain its
17
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relevant question; the relevant question was “whether or not DHS made a
reasoned decision to rescind DACA based on the Administrative Record.”22 The
future status of DACA and the Dreamers remains uncertain at the time of this
writing,23 although current ICE policy, light of the court order, is to continue
renewing requests for protection under DACA, but not register new admissions
to the program.24
II. THE CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY OF DEPORTATION
The crime against humanity of deportation has a long history.25 It was
considered a crime against humanity at least as far back as the Nuremberg26
and Tokyo Tribunals,27 as well as the Control Council ten tribunals.28 The
crime was also included in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),29 International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR),30 Special Court for Sierra Leone,31 Extraordinary

conclusion that the program was unlawful. Neither the meager legal reasoning nor the assessment of
litigation risk provided by DHS to support its rescission decision is sufficient to sustain termination of
the DACA program.”).
22
Id.
23
See id.; see also Casa De Md. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758, 779 (D. Md.
2018); Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437–38 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
24
See Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), ICE, https://www.ice.gov/daca (updated July 24, 2018) [hereinafter
Deferred Action for DACA and DAPA].
25
See Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, ¶ 473 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002).
26
See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis
art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Agreement]; United States v. Goring, Judgment, 1
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG 14
NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946 171, 227, 244, 297, 317–19, 329, (1947).
27
See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 5(c), Jan. 19, 1946, as amended
Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589.
28
See Control Council Law No. 10, art. II(1)(c), reprinted in 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 XVI (1947), https://www.loc.gov/rr/
frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-I.pdf; United States v. Milch, (“Milch Case (Luftwaffe)”), Case
No. 2, Judgment (Mil. Trib. II under Ctrl Cl Law No. 10, Apr. 16, 1947), reprinted in 2 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 773 (1947)
(Phillips, J, concur. Op., 860, 865); United States v. Krupp (“Krupp Case (Industrialist)”), Case No. 10 (Mil.
Trib. III under Ctrl Cl Law No. 10, July 31, 1948), 9(2) reprinted in 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 1327, 1432–33 (1947).
29
See S.C. Res. 827, para. 5(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,1993).
30
See S.C. Res. 955, para. 3(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
31
See S.C. Res. 1315, para. 2(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
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Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,32 and Kosovo Specialist Chambers.33
It can be found in the International Law Commission (ILC) Principles of
International Law Recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal,34
the 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind,35 and in the most recent Draft Articles on Crimes Against
Humanity.36 It is also considered a war crime when committed in the context
of an armed conflict,37 and the elements are largely the same whether it is a
war crime or crime against humanity.38 More recently, it was listed in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).39
A. Jurisdiction
The initial question is where such a crime can be prosecuted. This
question is critical because the precise requirements of the offense can differ
among jurisdictions. Most importantly, before the ICC, the prosecution
32

See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, Oct. 24, 2004, art. 5, (Cambodia).
See Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (No. 05/L-053), art. 13(d) (Kos.).
34
See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1950] II Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 377, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/34.
35
See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1954] II Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 149–50, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/88.
36
See Sean D. Murphy, Special Rapporteur for Crimes Against Humanity), First Rep. on Crimes Against
Humanity, ¶¶ 157, 177, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/680 (Feb. 17, 2015).
37
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 49, 147,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 85(4)(a), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol I].
38
See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 315
(1999). For this reason, some of the elements for the crime against humanity of deportation will be interpreted
by relying on practice applying the war crime of deportation.
39
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1)(d), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544
[hereinafter Rome Statute] (“For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack: . . . Deportation or forcible transfer of population . . . .”). “‘Deportation or forcible
transfer of population’ means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts
from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.” Id. at art.
7(2)(d).
33

The perpetrator deported or forcibly [footnote 12 - The term “forcibly” is not restricted to physical
force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress,
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or another
person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment] transferred, [footnote 13 - “Deported
or forcibly transferred” is interchangeable with “forcibly displaced”.] without grounds permitted
under international law, one or more persons to another State or location, by expulsion or other
coercive acts.
Elements of Crimes, OR Assembly of States Parties, 1st sess., New York, 3-10 Sep. 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 part
II.B, art. 7(1)(d), (Sept. 9, 2002).

WORSTERPROOFS_5.23.19

2019]

5/23/2019 10:04 AM

DEPORTING DREAMERS

373

needs to prove the additional element of a state policy.40 The particular
elements will be discussed further after this section on jurisdiction.
There are some possibilities for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction. The ICC
would have jurisdiction over actions taken against the Dreamers if any of the
expelling agents were nationals of a state party to the Rome Statute,41 but it
is not apparent that anyone involved is a dual national, with the other
nationality being a state party to the Rome Statute.
The ICC also has jurisdiction over crimes that take place on the territory
of a state party.42 The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute.43
However, there may be a solution. Just recently the ICC Prosecutor decided
to inquire about a case involving the deportation of Rohingya people.44 The
Rohingya people were expelled from Myanmar, which is not a state party to
the Rome Statute.45 However, the prosecution is arguing that the people were
expelled into Bangladesh,46 which is a state party. In order for the Court to
have jurisdiction, it would have to find that the expulsion to another state
was part of the offense, and thus, part of the crime occurred on the territory
of a state party.47
The same reasoning could be applied to the expulsion of Dreamers.
Although the United States is not a party to the Rome Statue, Mexico is.48 If
it could be argued that the expelled persons were removed to Mexico which
is a state party to the Rome Statute, there is a possibility that this aspect of
the crime would take place on the territory of a state party. The Court would
then have jurisdiction unless the United States was careful enough only to
expel individuals to a state that is not a party to the Rome Statute. Granted,

40

See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(1), 7(2)(a); Elements of Crimes, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(d).
See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 12(2)(b) (“The State of which the person accused of the crime is
a national.”).
42
See id., art. 12(2)(a) (“The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the
crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft.”).
43
See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/
states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited May 11,
2018).
44
See Prosecutor’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Art. 19(3) of the Statute ¶ 15, ICCRoC46(3)-01/18-1, Application under Reg. 46(3) (Apr. 9, 2018) [hereinafter Prosecutor’s Request].
45
See id.; The States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 43.
46
See Prosecutor’s Request, supra note 44.
47
See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 12(2)(a) (“The State on the territory of which the conduct in
question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of
that vessel or aircraft,”); Prosecutor’s Request, supra note 44.
48
See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 43.
41
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the United States would not have the freedom to expel persons to states
where they are not nationals or otherwise have a right to enter.
In addition to having jurisdiction, the ICC needs to have its jurisdiction
triggered.49 ICC jurisdiction can only be triggered by a referral from a state
party to the Rome Statute50 or the United Nations Security Council, taken
under Chapter VII.51 In some limited cases, the prosecutor might commence
a case proprio motu, but would remain under close supervision of the pretrial chamber.52 It seems highly unlikely that the U.N. Security Council
would refer the situation to the ICC, but Mexico could. And, of course, the
prosecutor could seek leave from the pre-trial chamber to commence
prosecution proprio motu as well.
If the ICC does not have jurisdiction, then the crime against humanity of
deportation could still be prosecuted by any state, since it is an international
crime under customary international law for which there is universal
jurisdiction.53
B. Contextual Elements
Moving onto the elements of the crime, the contextual element in the
crime against humanity of deportation is that the unlawful conduct takes part
in and forms a part of a widespread or systematic attack of comparable
offenses.54 Initially, deportation and other crimes against humanity were
only criminal in the context of armed conflict,55 though that condition was
quickly dropped.56 It is understood that crimes against humanity can also

49

See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 13.
See id., art. 13(a).
51
See id., art. 13(b).
52
See id., art. 13(c).
53
However, there is no treaty on crimes against humanity as such, so the existence of universal
jurisdiction is not definitively established outside of customary international law. The ILC is currently
working on Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, based on customary international law, that
contemplate universal jurisdiction. See Murphy, supra note 36, ¶ 120 (Jan. 21, 2016) (“Each State shall
also take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over the offences [of crimes against
humanity] when the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction or control, unless it
extradites or surrenders the person . . . .”).
54
See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(2); Elements of Crimes, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(d)(4) (“The
conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”).
“The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.” Id. at 7(1)(d)(5).
55
See London Agreement, supra note 26; Charter of the Int’l Military Tribunal art. 6(c), Jan. 19, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589.
56
See Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 28, art. II(1)(c).
50
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occur in peacetime,57 provided there is a widespread and systematic attack58
against a civilian population.59 There is no minimum number of deported
victims in order for the deportation to rise to an international crime.60
Instead, the deportations merely need to be a part of a larger pattern of attack
against a civilian population. Thus, a single victim by an accused will
suffice, provided the act of the accused forms part of a larger widespread or
systematic attack by others.61 This element helps explain why a deportation
campaign of only a single individual, even if contrary to international human
rights law, is not a crime against humanity. It is only when the criminal
expulsion takes place within a wider practice of massive similar criminal
expulsions that it becomes contrary to international law. Thus, an expulsion
becomes criminal under international law only if explusions are replicated on a
scale that appears to be a part of a larger widespread and systematic effort against
a civilian population.
Focusing on the nature of the civilian population, it is important to keep
in mind that the attack need not be military as long as it involves some “form
of violence against a civilian population.”62 Per usual, “civilian population”
describes individuals who are not members of the armed forces or who
otherwise qualify as combatants.63 Nationality, ethnicity, and other
characteristics are not relevant.64 The subject population need not be
57
See Prosecutor v. Kunarać, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 83 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia, June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment ¶ 249 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, July 15, 1999).
58
See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(2); Elements of Crimes, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(d)(4); Murphy,
supra note 36, ¶¶ 125–32.
59
See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 102–16, 135–39 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia, July 29, 2004); Kunarać, supra note 57, ¶ 100; Murphy, supra note 36, ¶¶ 133–37.
60
See Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgment, ¶ 108 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, Mar. 17, 2009); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 685 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia, July 31, 2003).
61
See Krajišnik, supra note 60, ¶ 309 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 17, 2009);
Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, ¶ 924 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Nov. 28,
2007); Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, ¶ 109 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia, July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 94 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 17, 2004); Blaškić, supra note 59, ¶ 101; Kunarać, supra note 57,
¶ 96.
62
See Elements of Crimes, supra note 39, art. 7(Intro.)(3), 7(1)(d); Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC01/04-01/07- 3436-tENG, Judgment pursuant to art. 74 of the Statute, ¶ 1101.
63
See Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ 1102; Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/0501/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Art. 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 78 (Int’l Crim. Ct., Tr. Ch. II, June 15, 2009); Kunarać, supra note 57, ¶ 425.
64
See Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ 1103; Bemba Gombo, supra note 63, ¶ 76; Prosecutor v. Kunarać,
Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & 23/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 423 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 22, 2001);
Tadić, supra note 57, ¶ 635.
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exclusively civilian, but “primarily civilian.”65 Furthermore, the attack must
have as its intended target the civilian population,66 which can be assessed
by examining:
[T]he means and method used in the course of the attack, the status
of the victims, their number, the discriminatory nature of the attack,
the nature of the crimes committed in its course, the resistance to
the assailants at the time and the extent to which the attacking force
may be said to have complied or attempted to comply with the
precautionary requirements of the laws of war.67

In the case of the Dreamers, an attempt to expel all or a significant part
of them could amount to an attack on a civilian population. Firstly, regarding
their status, non-U.S. citizens are largely forbidden from serving in the U.S.
Armed Forces, with only a few rare exceptions.68As a result, the vast
majority of Dreamers are civilians and are not serving in the military.69 The
question of whether the expulsions amount to an attack depends on the
manner of the deportations. Again, it is not necessary for the military to be
involved in order for the measures to constitute an attack. A passive
approach of removing only those individuals who come to the notice of
immigration authorities due to crime would not constitute an attack. But an
active effort, such as targeting individuals—perhaps by tracing the personal
information they provided to qualify for DACA, the use of aggressive police
tactics in creating a potential for almost one million persons to be targeted,
and any human rights abuses in the processes (e.g., the form and nature of
detention), could elevate a normal removal to an attack.

65
See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 582 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda,
Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 128 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda,
May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, ¶ 284 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, Jan. 31, 2005); Kunarać, supra note 57, ¶ 90; Kunarać, supra note 57, ¶ 425; Prosecutor v. Jelisić,
Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 54 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 14, 1999); Tadić, supra
note 57, ¶¶ 638–39.
66
See Prosecutor v. Katanga, supra note 61, ¶ 1104; Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, supra note 62,
¶¶ 76, 97–98; Prosecutor v. Stakić, supra note 59, ¶ 624; Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-T,
Judgment, ¶ 33 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Tr. Ch. II, Nov. 29, 2002); Kunarać, supra
note 57, ¶¶ 91–92.
67
See Kunarać, supra note 57, ¶ 91.
68
See Gregory Korte, Alan Gomez, & Kevin Johnson, Trump administration struggles with fate of 900
Dreamers serving in the military, USA TODAY (Sep. 7, 2017) https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2017/09/07/trump-administration-struggles-fate-900-dreamers-serving-military/640637001/(reporting that 900
Dreamers currently serve in the military under the pilot program “Military Accessions Vital to the National
Interest”, out of 800,000 in the DACA program, amounting to 0.1% of all Dreamers)
69
See id.
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Before we examine the substantive elements of deportation, we should
note that this Article will not discuss expulsion as persecution. Where the
specific elements of deportation are not proved, the same acts could
alternatively be charged as “persecution” when there is a discriminatory
element.70 Substantive arbitrariness in expulsion can also occur as a result of
the application of discriminatory classifications in expulsion procedures.71
As mentioned above, the jurisdiction of the ICC over crimes against
humanity is more limited than that provided under customary international
law.72 In order to prosecute a person for a crime against humanity at the ICC,
the act must be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population and must also be undertaken “pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy.”73 If this case was prosecuted under
customary international law, the element of state or organization policy
would not apply as it would before the ICC. However, for purposes of a
complete analysis, this Article will include the policy requirement in its
analysis here.
With regard to a state or organization’s policy, the prosecution must
prove that the existence of the policy is connected to a state or organization74
and that the acts forming the pattern of practice were undertaken in
pursuance of the policy.75 A policy need not be a formal design or plan, nor
completely thought through in advance,76 but can also be an intention,
unfolding throughout, to conduct an attack.77 It can be based on deliberate
action or omission.78 Moreover, not every criminal act must be connected to
the policy in order for it to be a policy.79 The existence of the policy can be
inferred from “repeated actions occurring according to a same sequence, or
70
See Guido Acquaviva (Chef de Cabinet, Special Tribunal Leb.), U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees,
Forced Displacement and International Crimes, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2011/05 (June 2011).
71
See Hum. Rts. Comm’n Gen. Comment No.15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant,
¶ 10, U.N. Doc. INT/CCPR/GEC/6625 (Apr. 11, 1986) (“Discrimination may not be made between
different categories of aliens in the application of article 13.”).
72
See Elements of Crimes, supra note 39; see also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 150–52 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 2010).
73
See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(chapeau), 7(2)(a); Elements of Crimes, supra note 39, art.
7(Intro.)(3), 7(1)(d); Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ 1097; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/0401/07-717, Dec. of the Confirm. of the Charges, ¶ 398 (Int’l Crim. Ct., Pre-Trial Ch., I, Sept. 30, 2008); Tadić,
supra note 57, ¶ 644.
74
See Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ ¶ 1097, 1106; Murphy, supra note 36, ¶¶ 138–44.
75
See Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ 1115.
76
See id., ¶ 1110.
77
See id., ¶ 1108.
78
See id., ¶ 1107; Elements of Crimes, supra note 39, arts. 7(intro.) n.6, 7(1)(d).
79
See Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ 1115.
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the existence of preparations or collective mobilisation orchestrated and
coordinated by that State or organisation.”80 While the nature of an actor
being a state is generally straightforward, whether the actors developing the
policy is an “organization” could be more problematic. This analysis will not
examine which actors qualify as organizations. Also, the state or
organization must “actively promote or encourage” the attack.81 In addition,
for the pattern of actions to be undertaken pursuant to the policy, it is not
necessary for them to be conducted by the agents of the same state or
organization that produced the policy.82
For the Dreamers, whether their removal would amount to a statedirected policy would depend on the plan that appeared after DACA
protections were terminated. If there was a directed pattern of actions in
which a maximum number of Dreamers were captured and expelled, the
practice would appear to be a qualifying policy. However, if the practice
were instead passive, meaning only that the DACA protections were lifted
but there was no policy in place to attempt to remove them solely due to their
status, then it is harder to see this as a policy for purposes of crimes against
humanity. Again, the policy need not be formally drafted or promulgated,
but rather must form a coherent pattern of practice.
Next, the prosecution must establish that the attack was either
widespread83 or systematic.84 Whether an attack is widespread is a question
of its large-scale nature85 and number of victims.86 Whether the attack is
systematic is a question of whether it is “organized”87 or falls into “nonaccidental” patterns.88 Any attack that has some organization will be, in a
sense, systematic and thus backed by a policy.89 However, an attack is
defined as systematic when it demonstrates a pattern of acts intended to
produce a consistent form of suffering, distinct from a collection of random,

80

See id., ¶ 1109.
See Elements of Crimes, supra note 39, art. 7(intro.).
82
See Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ 1116.
83
See id. ¶ 1098.
84
See id.; Elements of Crimes, supra note 39; Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(2).
85
See Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ 1098.
86
See Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (Ahmad Harun) & Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Rahman
(Ali Kushayb), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07-1-Corr, ¶ 62 (Int’l Crim. Ct., Tr. Ch. I, Apr. 27, 2007).
87
See Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ 1123; See generally Harun & Kushayb, supra note 84.
88
See Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ 1123; Katanga & Chui, supra note 71, ¶ 397; Akayesu, supra note
65, ¶ 580; Nahimana, supra note 61, ¶ 920; Kordić, supra note 61, ¶ 94; Blaškić, supra note 59, ¶ 101;
Kunarać, supra note 57, ¶ 94.
89
See Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ 1111.
81
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unrelated acts.90 In order to be systematic, the acts must not “not spontaneous
or isolated.”91 The Court will look at the “similarities in criminal practices,
continual repetition of a same modus operandi, similar treatment meted out
to victims or consistency in such treatment across a wide geographic area.”92
For this element, the resulting actions against Dreamers would need to
be either organized with a focus on Dreamers, rather than on any unlawfully
present person, or covering a large area within the United States. The forms
of the coercion would also need to be similar, which would be satisfied if the
actions were all comparable arrests, detention and expulsion. The precise
modalities of each expulsion would not have to be identical as long as they
were generally of the same nature.
If the expulsions were passive, in the sense that Dreamers would only be
removed if they brought themselves to the attention of law enforcement by
committing a crime, then it is harder to see that they are being targeting as a
group. Also, if the deportation is served by mailed notifications, without
coercive action, it is hard to view the removal as an attack. On the other
hand, if the expulsion is carried out by enforcement officers using coercive
force to overcome resistance, perhaps armed with weapons, on a large
enough portion of the 800,000 persons, then there is stronger argument that
the deportation amounted to an “attack.”
C. Actus Reus
Turning from the contextual element to the substantive elements, the
crime of deportation involves the forced displacement of individuals from
the area in which they are lawfully present across and international border
without grounds permitted under international law.”93 There is no

90

See Harun & Kushayb, supra note 84, ¶ 62.
See Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ 1123; Katanga & Chui, supra note 71, ¶ 397; Akayesu, supra
note 65, ¶ 580.
92
Katanga, supra note 62, ¶ 1111.
93
See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 49; Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(2)(d);
Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) &
(b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 243 (Jan. 23, 2012); Prosecutor v. Prlić, IT-04-74-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 47, 300 (May 29,
2013); Krajišnik, supra note 60, ¶¶ 304–08; Stakić, supra note 60, ¶¶ 276-308; Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No.
IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 540 (Sept. 1, 2004); Prosecutor v. Simić et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 121–
22 (Oct. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v. Naletilić & Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T ¶ 670 (Mar. 31, 2003); Prosecutor
v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment ¶ 218 (Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Krnojelac 2003]; Prosecutor
v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment ¶¶ 474–76 (Mar. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Kronjelac 2002];
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment ¶¶ 521, 531-32 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case
No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 679 (July 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Separate
91
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requirement about the identity of the victims. When deportation is charged
as a war crime, the persons must be “protected persons,”94 but when charged
as a crime against humanity, there is no such requirement.95
1. Forcible Expulsion
The first requirement is that the expulsion must be forcible.96 This means
that the expulsion must be induced by a coercive act such that leaving the
state by crossing a border is involuntary.97 The removal need not be
conducted by the military, as long as it involves force.98 The kinds of acts
that might qualify are the more obvious acts of arrest and transportation,99
but circumstances of fear, duress, or other oppression that leave the person
with no real alternative but to leave also qualify.100 The particular type of act
is not significant101 provided it produces an effect that the victim must flee.102
Whether the person cooperates with the expulsion, or even facilitates or
requests the expulsion, is not material.103 While the Naletilić trial chamber
Opinion of Judge Schomburg, ¶ 15 (Sep. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. Case No. IT-98-33-T,
Judgment ¶ 521 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 234 (Mar. 3, 2000);
Int’l L. Comm’n, First Rep. on the Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/680 ¶ 177, Draft art. 2(1)(d)
(2015) [hereinafter Crimes Against Humanity].
94
See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 122–23 (2d ed., Oxford University Press
2008).
95
See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Several Motions Challenging
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 24–26 (Mar. 19, 2007).
96
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 49; Elements of Crimes, supra note 39; Ruto, supra
note 91, ¶ 243; Prosecutor v. Popopvić et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, ¶ 896 (June 10, 2010); Stakić, supra note 60,
¶ 279; Krnojelac 2003, supra note 91, ¶233; Krnojelac 2002, supra 91, ¶475; Krstić, supra note 91, ¶ 528;
Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 91, ¶ 159; JEAN S. PICTET, COMMENTARY, IV, GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 279 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,1958) [hereinafter
GC IV COMMENTARY].
97
See Ruto, supra note 91, ¶ 244; Stakić, supra note 60, ¶ 279; Brđanin, supra note 91, at ¶ 543; Simić,
supra note 91, ¶ 125; Stakić, supra note 60, ¶ 682; Naletilić & Martinović, supra note 91, ¶ 519; Krnojelac
2003, supra note 91, ¶ 233; Krnojelac 2003, supra note 91,¶ 475; Krstić, supra note 91, ¶ 528; Crimes
Against Humanity, supra note 91, ¶ 157; GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 94, at 277–83.
98
See State Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 43.
99
See Stakić, supra note 60, ¶ 281; Krnojelac 2002, supra note 91, ¶ 475; Krstić, supra note 91, ¶ 529.
100
See Popopvić, supra note 91, ¶ 896; Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al. (“Kosovo Six”), Case No.
IT-05-87-T, Judgment¶ 164 (Feb. 26, 2009); Stakić, supra note 60, ¶¶ 279–82; Simić, supra note 91,
¶¶ 125–6; Naletilić & Martinović, supra note 91, ¶ 519; Krnojelac 2003, supra note 91, ¶ 229; Kunarać,
supra note 57, ¶ 129; Krnojelac 2002, supra note 91, ¶ 475; Krstić, supra note 91, ¶¶ 147, 529; Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court, Finalised Draft Text of the Elements of the Crimes,
UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 11 (July 6, 2000).
101
See Ruto, supra note 91, ¶ 244.
102
Compare Ruto, supra note 91, ¶ 245 (“acts that the perpetrator has performed produced the effect to
deport or forcibly transfer the victim.”) with Rankin & U.S. v. Iran, Case No. 10913, Award, 17 IUSCTR 135
(Iran-US Cl. Trib., Ch. 2, Nov. 3, 1987) (regarding constructive expulsion).
103
Prlić, supra note 91, ¶ 51; Stakić, supra note 91, ¶ 279; Krnojelac 2003, supra note 91, ¶ 229.
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held that a genuine wish to leave the area on the part of the victim would
preclude a conviction for deportation,104 other trial chambers have held that
consent to the removal does not make it lawful.105 The distinction being that
while genuine consent might make their removal lawful, the use of force
would prevent genuine consent.106 Generally, the expulsion measure can
constitute any act, not only formal deportation procedures, provided it seeks
the removal of the person from the state’s territory.107 What is critical is that
the person must have had no real choice in leaving.108
As noted above, for the removal of Dreamers to amount to an
international crime, their removal must be by coercive force. ICE could opt
to simply inform the Dreamers by mail or other notification that their status
has expired and request that they remove themselves. If the removal effort
was elevated to arrest and forcible expulsion, then the element would be
satisfied. There is already some evidence that physical force might be used
against Dreamers.109 The greater difficulty is whether other efforts in
between these extremes might create a situation of fear or duress that would
make it impossible to stay. Revoking social security numbers, employment
authorization, and travel authorization, and terminating health care
insurance, education status, and driving licenses, might collectively—
especially for someone who has come to depend on such benefits under
DACA—make life extraordinarily difficult and trigger “self-deportation.”110
If the person really had no choice but to leave, then the action could be
considered coercive.111 If ICE degrades the Dreamers’ condition of life to
104
Popopvić et al., supra note 94, ¶ 896; Stakić, supra note 60, ¶ 279; Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 125;
Naletilić & Martinović, supra note 91, ¶ 519.
105
Prlić, supra note 91,¶ 51.
106
Id.; Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 125; Krnojelac 2002, supra note 91, ¶ 475 n. 1435; Krstić, supra note
91, ¶ 530.
107
JEAN MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 109
(Martinus NijHoff, 1995) (discussing how expulsion is “an act, or a failure to act, by an authority of a State with
the intention and with the effect of securing the removal of a person or persons against their will from the territory
of that State”); Eur. Consult. Ass., Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, E.T.S. No. 117 (1985) (explaining expulsion as “any
measure compelling the departure of an alien from the territory”).
108
Prlić, supra note 91,¶ 50; Popopvić, supra note 94,¶ 896; Krajišnik, supra note 60,¶ 319; Stakić, supra
note 60, ¶¶ 279–82; Brđanin, supra note 91, ¶ 543; Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 125; Stakić, supra note 60,
¶ 707; Krnojelac 2002, supra note 91, ¶¶ 229, 233; Krnojelac 2002, supra note 91, ¶ 475; Krstić, supra note 91,
¶ 147; Kunarać, supra note 57, ¶¶ 127–28, 460.
109
See Jarvie, supra note 19.
110
Cf. Yeager (U.S.) v. Iran, Case No. 10199, Award No. 324-10199-1, Partial Award, 17 I.US.CT.R. 92
(Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib., Ch. 1, Nov. 2, 1987) (finding that the measures taken amounted to a constructive expulsion,
notwithstanding that there was no official expulsion order).
111
See id.
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the point that they leave the United States, the coercive element would be
satisfied. Given the comments of the acting-Director of ICE regarding a
desire to instill fear in Dreamers, this may be a possible outcome.112
2. Expulsion Out of a State
Secondly, the expulsion must be from one state into another state.113 In
most of these legal provisions, the crime of deportation is paired with that of
forcible transfer; however, it is a separate offense.114 Both protect the same
underlying values. The key distinction is that forcible transfer involves any
forced expulsion of persons within a state, while deportation involves the
forced expulsion of persons out of a state.115 There is a split of opinion in the
jurisprudence over whether a de jure border must be crossed116 or whether a
de facto border will suffice.117 The ILC Draft Code only requires that the
expulsion be “from the national territory.”118 The Fourth Geneva Convention
and Security Council resolutions provide that deportation from occupied

112
See Clio Chang, ICE Chief Is Having A Great Time Waging Terror Against Immigrants, SPLINTER
(Jan. 31, 2018), https://splinternews.com/ice-chief-is-having-a-great-time-waging-terror-against-18226010
52.
113
Elements of Crimes, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(d); Prlić, supra note 91, ¶ 55; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case
No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 278, 289, 300 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 22, 2006);
Stakić, supra note 60, ¶ 679; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 234 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia, Tr. Ch., Mar. 3, 2000).
114
See Elements of Crimes, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(d); Appl. under Reg. 46(3), ICC. Doc. ICC-RoC46(3)01/18-1, Prosecutor’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction Under Article 19(3) of the Statute ¶ 19 (Apr. 9, 2018);
Antonio Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity, in 1 CASSESE, GAETA, & JONES, EDS, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 373–74 (2002).
115
See Prlić, supra note 91, at ¶ 47; Krajišnik, supra note 60, ¶ 304; Stakić, supra note 111, ¶¶ 278, 300,
302, 317; Krnojelac 2002, supra note 91, ¶ 474; Krstić, supra note 91, ¶¶ 521, 531; United States v. Milch
(“Milch Case (Luftwaffe)”), Case No. 2, Judgment, (Mil. Trib. II under Ctrl Cl Law No. 10, Apr. 16, 1947),
reprinted in 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 773 (1947) (Phillips, J, concur. Op., 860, 865); United States v. Flick (Flick Case), Case
No. 5 (Mil. Trib. IV under Ctrl Cl Law No. 10, Dec. 22, 1947), 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 1187 (1947); United States v.
Krupp, Case No. 10, Mil. Trib. III under Ctrl. Cl Law No. 10, (July 31, 1948), 9(2); TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 1327, 1432–33 (1947).
116
See Stakić, supra note 111,¶ 299; Brđanin, supra note 91, ¶ 540; Simić et al., supra note 91,¶¶ 122–
23; Naletilić & Martinović, supra note 91, ¶ 670; Krnojelac 2003, supra note 91, ¶¶ 214–15; Krnojelac 2002,
supra note 91, ¶¶ 474, 476, 198, n.1429; Krstić, supra note 91, ¶¶ 521, 531.
117
See Prosecutor v. Ðorđević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 532 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, Appls. Ch., Jan. 27, 2014); Prlić, supra note 91, ¶ 55; Krajišnik, supra note 60, ¶ 304; Stakić, supra
note 111, ¶¶ 288–303.
118
See Stakić, supra note 111, ¶ 295; Int’l L. Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of Its Forty-Third Session (Apr. 29 – July 19, 1991), art. 21 ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/46/10.
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territory would also qualify.119 The dominant view is that the persons must
be expelled across a de jure international border.120
This view does not necessarily mean that the physical presence in the
new state’s territory must be proved to establish the crime. While some case
law has suggested that arrival abroad might be required, that conclusion was
defining the actus reus, so it is not certain that arrival abroad is necessary.121
Certainly presence outside the border is the logical consequence,122 but a
person might be expelled onto the high seas or into outer space. While there
must be an expelling act, arrival in a foreign state need not be proved. It
remains unclear whether an attempt to expel persons across a border would
then suffice since there is no need to prove the arrival abroad. After all,
another way to view the requirement of arrival abroad is as a causation
element of the act.123 For purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to reach
a conclusion on this precise point.
For the situation of the Dreamers, this element would be satisfied if they
were crossing the border. While arrival in the foreign state does not appear
to be a necessary element, leaving the state is. Therefore, if Dreamers were
able to continue living in the United States, then no deportation would have
taken place. Criteria for expulsion would only be satisfied if massive
numbers of Dreamers were expelled.
3. Expulsion Unlawful Under International Law
The expulsion must be unlawful.124 However, this requirement has two
elements, the precise relationship of which is unclear: (1) lawful presence of
the victims and (2) the unlawful removal of the victims in violation of
international law.125 It could be two sides of the same element, meaning that

119
See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 49; S.C. Res. 469 (May 20, 1980); S.C. Res. 484
(Dec. 19, 1980); S.C. Res. 607 (Jan. 5, 1988); S.C. Res. 608 (Jan. 14, 1988); S.C. Res. 636 (July 6, 1989); S.C.
Res. 641 (Aug. 30, 1989); S.C. Res. 681 (Dec. 20, 1990); S.C. Res. 694 (May 24, 1991); S.C. Res. 726 (Jan. 6,
1992); S.C. Res. 799 (Dec. 18, 1992); G.A. Res. 40/161, annex, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (Nov. 29, 1985); Stakić, supra note 111, ¶ 300.
120
See Brđanin, supra note 91, ¶ 542; Krnojelac 2002, supra note 91, ¶¶ 474, 198 n.1429.
121
See Prosecutor v. Popopvić, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, ¶ 893 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, Tr. Ch. II, June 10, 2010).
122
See Popopvić et al., supra note 94, ¶ 892.
123
See id., ¶ 893.
124
See Brđanin, supra note 91, ¶ 543; Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 124; Krnojelac 2002, supra note 91,
¶ 475; Krstić, supra note 91, ¶ 524.
125
See London Agreement, supra note 26, art. 6(c); Krnojelac 2002, supra note 91, ¶ 473; BASSIOUNI,
supra note 38, at 179.
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any person who is lawfully present cannot be removed. Nevertheless, for
purposes of this analysis, we will assume that we need to prove two separate
elements: that the victims must be both (1) lawfully present and (2) that their
removal must violate international law.
a. Alien Lawfully Present
Looking first at lawful presence, prosecutions for deportation, initially,
were limited to deportations by perpetrators of fellow nationals from their
shared state.126 Some tribunals have suggested that the victims simply should
not be “forced to become refugees . . . to live in a foreign State, subjected to
foreign laws and authorities, and with no role in the political decisionmaking process,” which suggests that the test for lawful presence might be
nationality.127 After all, removal to one’s state of nationality would not be a
“foreign” place where a person would qualify as a “refugee.” However,
nationality as such was not specifically required, which suggests that the
more vague meaning of “foreign” was simply a different state from the one
the person lived in. Nationality is therefore not the test.
The more precise requirement of lawful presence—although missing
from the ILC Draft Code—emerges over time. In the case of deportation as
a war crime, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study on
customary international humanitarian law only requires that the deportees be
a “civilian population.”128 In the Simić case, the ICTY Trial Chamber held
only that the deportation constituted the forcible removal of people “from
the territory in which they reside” and made no mention of whether the
residence of the victims was lawful.129 Subsequent case law clarified that
while nationality was not required, the victim must be “lawfully present.”130

126
See London Agreement, supra note 26, art. 6(c); Krnojelac 2002, supra note 91, ¶ 473; BASSIOUNI,
supra note 38, at 179.
127
See Ðorđević, supra note 115, ¶¶ 533–36; Prlić, supra note 91, ¶ 47; Popopvić et al., supra note 94,
¶ 892; Stakić, supra note 111, ¶ 300; see also [In re Deportation of the Rohingya People from Myanmar to
Bangladesh], ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction Under Art.
19(3) of the Statute, ¶16 (Apr. 9, 2018) [hereinafter In re Rohingya People].
128
See 1 INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, J-M. HENCKAERTS & L. DOSWALD-BECK, EDS., CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES Rule 129 (2005); Stakić, supra note 111, ¶ 296.
129
See Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 121; Krstić, supra note 91, ¶ 521.
130
See Popopvić et al., supra note 94, ¶¶ 899–900; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, art. 7(2)(d), 2187 U.N.T.S. (No. 38544) (entered into force July 1, 2002); Elements of
Crimes, supra note 39 (“Such person or persons were lawfully present in the area from which they were so
deported or transferred.”).
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In addition, the lawfulness of their residence was not defined exclusively
by domestic law, but by international law.131 Lawful presence under
international law is difficult to establish because international law does not
have clear and consistent migration laws that determine whether presence is
lawful. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the question of whether an alien is “lawfully” present is informed
by domestic law, but only insofar as domestic law conforms to a state’s
international obligations.132 The Human Rights Committee has held
specifically that once an unlawfully present alien has his or her status
regularized, that the alien is then considered lawfully present.133 At that
point, the alien should be treated in ways comparable to a national, and any
distinction between nationals and aliens would need to be justified.134
However, the practice of criminal prosecutions has applied an even less
demanding approach. Rather than looking at domestic immigration law or
drawing analogies with international human rights law to identify lawfulness
131
See Prosecutor v. Ðorđević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 1616, 1640 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia, Appls. Ch., Feb. 20, 2011); Popopvić et. al., supra note 94, ¶ 900.

[W]hether an individual has lived in a location for a sufficient period of time to meet the
requirements for residency or whether he or she has been accorded such status under immigration
laws is irrelevant. Rather, what is important is that the protection is provided to those who have,
for whatever reason, come to “live” in the community—whether long term or temporarily. . . . In
the view of the Trial Chamber, the requirement for lawful presence is intended to exclude only
those situations where the individuals are occupying houses or premises unlawfully or illegally
and not to impose a requirement for “residency” to be demonstrated as a legal standard[.]
Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 125; Krnojelac 2002, supra note 91, ¶ 475; Krstić, supra note 91, ¶¶ 524, 526.
132
See Hum. Rts. Comm., Gen. Comm. No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), at ¶ 4,
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 2, 1999)
Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State enjoys, within that territory, the right to
move freely and to choose his or her place of residence. In principle, citizens of a State are
always lawfully within the territory of that State. The question whether an alien is “lawfully”
within the territory of a State is a matter governed by domestic law, which may subject the
entry of an alien to the territory of a State to restrictions, provided they are in compliance
with the State’s international obligations.
133
See id. (finding that an alien without authorized status in the state, but whose status has been
“regularized,” may be considered lawfully present); Celepli v. Sweden, Communication 456/1991,
Human Rights Committee, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/456/1991 (July 26, 1994)

The Committee notes that the author’s expulsion was ordered on 10 December 1984, but
that this order was not enforced and that the author was allowed to stay in Sweden, subject
to restrictions on his freedom of movement. The Committee is of the view that, following
the expulsion order, the author was lawfully in the territory of Sweden, for purposes of
article 12, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, only under the restrictions placed upon him by the
State party.
134

See Gen. Comm. No. 27, supra note 130, ¶ 4.
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of immigration status, the approach of some tribunals has been to focus on
the integration into a community. Some cases identified the removal of the
person from “a particular culture, society, language, set of values, and legal
protections.”135 The court did not demand any evidence of integration into
the society or culture, although the mention of language could imply a degree
of integration. Several courts have concluded that the purpose of the
criminalization is to protect individuals’ right to “live in their communities
and homes.”136 Speaking in the context of any forced displacement, whether
deportation or transfer, the ICTY defined the act as “abandoning one’s
home.”137 It could be that the test would then require a certain degree of
lengthy time to establish presence in a home and community.138
But length of residency and level of integration appear only to emphasize
why the crime might exist, and not be formally part of the test. Other
tribunals have held that the test for lawful presence is not the degree of
integration but simply whether the person has “come to ‘live’ in the
community—whether long term or temporarily.”139 By applying this test, it
would still be a criminal act to remove internally displaced persons or
refugees from temporary homes they occupy after fleeing from danger.140 If
the requirement is participation in society and culture, yet with a more
narrow focus on home and community, then the culture, society, language,
etc. required need not be the ones practiced in the state at large, but only the
ones existing at a community level.
It might be that participation in a local minority community-based
language would even suffice. Following from this jurisprudence, the ICTY
in Popopvić held that “the requirement for lawful presence is intended to
exclude only those situations where the individuals are occupying houses or
135
See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13(2) (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M.
368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; In re Rohingya People, supra note 126, ¶ 17.
136
See In re Rohingya People, supra note 125, ¶ 17; Prlić, supra note 91, ¶; Popopvić, Case No. IT-0588-T, at ¶ 890; Stakić, supra note 60, ¶¶ 277, 677; Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 130.
137
See Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 123; Krstić, supra note 91, ¶ 523; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, et al., Case
No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 566 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Tr. Ch., Jan. 14, 2000).
138
See Popopvić et al., supra note 94, ¶ 899; Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 130; Krstić, supra note 91,
¶ 523; INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, YVES SANDOZ, CHRISTOPHE SWINARSKI & BRUNO ZIMMERMAN, EDS.,
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949 1473, ¶ 4847 (1987) [hereinafter AP COMMENTARY].
139
See Popopvić et al., supra note 94, ¶ 900.
140
See id. (“Clearly the protection is intended to encompass, for example, internally displaced persons
who have established temporary homes after being uprooted from their original community.”). Therefore, it
would also be a crime to expel internally displaced persons.
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premises unlawfully or illegally and not to impose a requirement for
‘residency’ to be demonstrated as a legal standard.”141 This finding means
that integration with and enjoyment of a particular community is part of the
protected interest, but not the legal test. The test would be whether the victim
is lawfully living in the home or is an occupier or squatter without any color
of law. Other cases have identified the loss of property as a part of the
concern with deportation, meaning that homeownership could establish
lawful residence.142 Thus, “lawful presence” is not a test for compliance with
domestic immigration laws, but it is —at its most basic level—a test of
lawful residence in a home, i.e., excluding persons who have made a home
against the right of the homeowner or landlord. This presence would then,
as a factual matter, result in enjoyment of the local community, and
integration into that community is not required. Integration will, however,
come up again in the section below.
The Dreamers would qualify for lawful presence under any one of these
various tests. Surely, Dreamers qualify under the “home” test. These people
are not squatting in their homes; they may be renting or owning their homes
lawfully. Removal would mean loss of their property or rental rights of
enjoyment. However, even if the above analysis about the precise test for
lawful presence is incorrect, and the test is actually the more demanding one
of integration into a community, many Dreamers would still qualify. Many
are integrated by participating either in a local society, perhaps as narrow as
their language community, or in a wider society. One would imagine that
arrival as a child and spending formative years in the state would make
integration even more substantial, even though this is not a formal
requirement for “lawful presence” for purposes of the crime of deportation.
In fact, even if the test for lawful presence is authorized status under
domestic immigration law, Dreamers would still qualify. Under DACA, one
could argue that Dreamers had their status regularized. They did not become
citizens, but their residence was authorized under certain conditions. By
creating a program of tolerating the presence of Dreamers under DACA,
those people were given some form of lawful presence under domestic
immigration laws with rights to participate in the local labor force,
education, etc. But, as mentioned above, the better understanding of the test
for lawful presence is the “home” test, and the Dreamers certainly qualify on
this point.

141
142

See id.
See Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 123; Krstić, supra note 91,¶ 523; Kupreškić, supra note 135, ¶ 566.
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b. Right to Reside in One’s “Own State”
Thus, the next question is when the expulsion of aliens is lawful under
international law.143 Surely the normal deportation of unlawfully present
persons cannot be criminal, even if it involves large numbers of individuals
and even if it means that they must leave their home and community. If this
were the case, then the vast amount of deportations all over the world would
be criminal. This cannot have been the intention of the drafters of the Rome
Statute, and it has not been the practice of any international criminal tribunal.
One of the critical differences between criminal deportation and normal,
permissible deportation hinges on the removal being wrongful under
international law.144 Human rights law generally permits the expulsion of
aliens; however, international law places limitations on that power, creating
the possibility of removal being unlawful.145
Under human rights law, an individual may not be arbitrarily expelled
from or refused admission to his or her “own country.”146 This rule applies
to any form of state action, whether it is by legislation, judicial decision,
administrative regulation or any other measure.147 The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights states that “[e]veryone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.”148 This provision functions
as a fundamental rule of human rights because it essentially prohibits exile,
and prohibits a state from depriving a person of such a significant aspect of
their identity.149 The International Convent on Civil and Political Rights
143

See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(2)(d); Elements of Crimes, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(d).
See Popopvić et al., supra note 94, ¶ 891; Krajišnik, supra note 60, ¶ 304; Stakić, supra note 111,
¶¶ 278, 317; Prosecutor v. Milutinović (Kosovo Six), Case No. IT-05-87- T, Judgment, ¶ 164 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia, Tr. Ch., Feb. 26, 2009); Brđanin, supra note 94, ¶ 544; Krnojelac 2002, supra note
91, ¶ 475; Krstić, supra note 91, ¶ 524.
145
See Eritrea v. Ethiopia, 26 R.I.A.A. 195, 225 Partial Award, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004), ¶¶ 79–82 (finding
that a state has the right to expel aliens, provided it is not an arbitrary expulsion); Maal v. Venez., 10 R.I.A.A.
707, 730 (June 1, 1903) (finding that states have a right to expel aliens that present a danger or are otherwise
prejudicial to the state, i.e., that there must be cause for the expulsion).
146
See Gen. Comm. No. 27, supra 130, ¶¶ 19, 21 (“The right of a person to enter his or her own country
recognizes the special relationship of a person to that country. . . . In no case may a person be arbitrarily deprived
of the right to enter his or her own country.”).
147
See id., ¶ 21 (“The reference to the concept of arbitrariness in this context is intended to emphasize that
it applies to all State action, legislative, administrative and judicial; it guarantees that even interference provided
for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in
any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances.”).
148
See UDHR, supra note 133, art. 13(2) (“Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.”).
149
See ICCPR, supra note 133, arts. 12, 26; Tunis & Morocco Nationality Decrees, Advisory Opinion,
1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 4, at 24; Int’l Law Comm’n, Vaclav Mikulka, Spec. Rapp., Second Report on State
Succession and its Impact on the Nationality of Natural and Legal Persons, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/474 (1996); Bill
144
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(ICCPR) operationalized this aspirational right into a binding norm when it
provided that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his
own country.”150 Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination sets out the same rule.151 Other binding law for
situations of armed conflict set out rules prohibiting expulsions of protected
persons and for the return of protected persons to their homes after the armed
conflict ends.152
The question is the scope of “own country” and whether it applies to
certain categories of aliens. Initially, some thought the rule only applied to
nationals.153 Others thought that it would cover any person who resides in
the state or relies on the state to function as the person’s home.154 The terms
of the ICCPR are applicable to all persons, because the relevant article of the
ICCPR, Article 12, was not limited to nationality, as the other of the ICCPR
articles were.155 Nationality was a requirement for other provisions of the
ICCPR, so the fact that it was not made a requirement for “his own country”
means it is not the test for that status. In fact, early drafts of the ICCPR used
the expression “country of which he is a national” but were deliberately
changed to “his own country.”156 Some authorities have sought meaning in
the use of the term “country” rather than the more formal “state,” and that
the use of country must mean a place with a genuine connection.157
Frelick, The Right of Return, 2 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 442, 444 (1990).
150
See ICCPR, supra note 133, art. 12(4).
151
See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5(d)(ii),
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
152
See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, arts. 49, 77.
153
See HURST HANNUM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 59
(1987); Goralczyk, Governing Rules Project: Review and Discussion on the Movement of Persons Across
Borders, 85 PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L 51, 56–57 (1991).
154
See HANNUM, supra note 152, at 59; Donna E. Arzt & Karen Zughaib, Return to Negotiated Lands:
The Likelihood and Legality of a Population Transfer Between Israel and a Future Palestinian State, 24 NYU
J. INT’L L. & POL. 1399, 1445 (1992); Frelick, supra note 148, at 442; Goralczyk, supra note 152, at 56–57.
155
See Gen. Comm. No. 27, supra note 130, ¶ 20 (“The wording of article 12, paragraph 4, does not
distinguish between nationals and aliens (‘no one’). Thus, the persons entitled to exercise this right can be
identified only by interpreting the meaning of the phrase ‘his own country’.”); Human Rights Comm., Gen.
Comm. No. 15, The Position of Aliens under the Covenant, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Apr. 11, 1986)
[hereinafter Gen. Comm. No. 15] (“Thus, the general rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be
guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens. . . . Exceptionally, some of the rights recognized
in the Covenant are expressly applicable only to citizens (art. 25), while article 13 applies only to aliens.”); Hum.
Rts. Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee concerning Communication No. 538/1993: Stewart v.
Canada, ¶¶ 12.2–12.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 [hereinafter Stewart v. Canada].
156
See MARK J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 261 (1987).
157
See M. Knisbacher, Aliyah of Soviet Jews: Protection of the Right of Emigration under International
Law, 14 HARV. INT’L L.J. 89, 96–97 (1973).
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Certainly nationality falls under the umbrella of “his own country,”158
but the Human Rights Committee has found that certain links other than
nationality will also qualify.159 A person has a bond with “his own country”
when that person has a “special relationship” with the state.160 In essence,
the question is whether the person is a “mere alien” or has “special ties or
claims in relation to the country.”161 Once a person has formed this special
relationship, he or she has the right to return to his or her own country and
the implicit right not to be expelled from it.162 This finding makes sense.
Consider, for example, a state might simply declare that a person never
established his or her nationality, or, even more grave, might revoke the
person’s nationality, rendering the person an alien in his own state.163 This
reading is consistent with the larger practice of rights under the ICCPR. The
Covenant does not, generally, limit state discretion over who is admitted,164
and under what conditions.165 It does, however, prohibit a state from
excluding aliens in a way that violates other rights in the Covenant, such as
non-discrimination, protections against inhuman treatment and right to
maintain family life.166
In terms of establishing the special relationship that makes a state one’s
“own country,” a variety of factors are considered. This link is meant to be
tested by international law, not domestic law.167 The Committee gave a nonexhaustive list of examples of aliens having the requisite connection.168 It

158
See Gen. Comm. No. 27, supra note 130, ¶ 20 (“The scope of ‘his own country’ is broader than the
concept ‘country of his nationality’ . . . . It is not limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is, nationality
acquired at birth or by conferral . . . .”); BOSSUYT, supra note 155, at 262; GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 255 (1978); Karl Doehring, Aliens,
Expulsion and Deportation, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (Rudolf Berhardt ed.,
1992); John Fisher Williams, Denationalization, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 45, 61 (1927).
159
See Stewart v. Canada, supra note 154.
160
See Gen. Comm. No. 27, supra note 130, ¶ 19 (“The right of a person to enter his or her own country
recognizes the special relationship of a person to that country.”).
161
See id. (“[I]t embraces, at the very least, an individual who, because of his or her special ties to or
claims in relation to a given country, cannot be considered to be a mere alien.”).
162
See id., ¶ 19.
163
See Exec. Comm. on the Int’l Prot. of Refugees, Conclusion No. 40 (XXXVI), Voluntary Repatriation,
U.N. Doc A/40/12/Add.1 (Oct. 18, 1985).
164
See Gen. Comm. No. 15, supra note 154, ¶ 5, (“The Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to
enter or reside in the territory of a State party. It is in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit
to its territory . . . .”).
165
See id., ¶ 6.
166
See id., ¶ 5.
167
See Gen. Comm. No. 27, supra note 130.
168
See id., ¶¶ 20–21 (“A State party must not, by stripping a person of nationality or by expelling an
individual to a third country, arbitrarily prevent this person from returning to his or her own country.”).
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included (1) nationals whose nationality have been revoked in violation of
international law, (2) individuals whose country of nationality has been
incorporated into another state and whose nationality is not recognized, or
(3) stateless persons arbitrarily prohibited from acquiring nationality in their
state of residence.169 Other strong ties might qualify as well,170 such as a
connection of history, family, ethnicity, religion, or other similar ties.171 The
most important of these criteria might be habitual residence.172 Reflecting a
similar understanding, the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm
case held that the formal bond between an individual and his or her state of
nationality does not, as a state act, demand automatic acceptance in
international relations.173 In that case, the Court permitted a state to refuse to
respect the formal bond of nationality when the individual’s relationship to
the state lacked a “genuine” connection, at least insofar as it related to
diplomatic protection.174 The corollary to this finding would be that an
individual who does not enjoy the formal bond of nationality with a state
might nonetheless have the substantive connection de facto, based on the
degree to which the person has integrated his or her life with that of the state.
The question for Dreamers is whether they have sufficient genuine links
or special ties to the United States to consider it their “own country.” Since
Dreamers have lived the majority, if not essentially the entirety, of their lives
in the United States, they have a strong link of history, habitual residence,
and potentially family as well175 Opinion polls consistently show that an
overwhelming majority of Americans consider it cruel and unjust to expel
Dreamers.176 While an opinion poll is not determinative, it does show a
169

See id.
See id., ¶ 20 (“[O]ther factors may in certain circumstances result in the establishment of close and
enduring connections between a person and a country . . . .”).
171
See HANNUM, supra note 152, at 56.
172
See Johannes M. M. Chan, The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 12
(1991).
173
See Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 23 (April 6, 1955).
174
See id. at 26.
175
Cf. id. (listing similar factors constituting a “genuine link” sufficient for nationality)
176
See Steven Shepard, Poll: Majority opposes deporting Dreamers, POLITICO (Sept. 5, 2017)
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/05/poll-trump-deporting-daca-dreamers-242343.
170

A majority of voters, 58 percent, think these undocumented immigrants, also known as Dreamers,
should be allowed to stay and become citizens if they meet certain requirements—a sentiment
that goes well beyond the existing DACA program. Another 18 percent think they should be
allowed to stay and become legal residents, but not citizens. Only 15 percent think they should
be removed or deported from the country. Id.
See also Marist Poll Dec. 4–7, 2017, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/immigration.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2019) (fifty-eight percent of Dreamers can “stay, become citizens”; twenty-three percent
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reciprocal view of the American public that these persons are highly
integrated and not mere aliens.
In making this determination of “own country” the rights of the child
should be kept in mind. Dreamers were brought to the United States as
children. Many have since become adults, but others are still under eighteen
years of age. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) requires
that states take additional steps to preserve a child’s identity.177 As in the
prohibition on arbitrary expulsion from one’s own country, the restriction on
expulsion is partly aimed at protecting a person from being exiled from the
place that serves as the focus of his or her social life.178 Further the CRC
demands that “[i]n all actions concerning children . . . the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration.”179 Surely in interpreting the
protection against arbitrary expulsion, and the criminalization of deportation
as a crime against humanity, the requirements should be read to protect a
child’s stability of home and community.
This Article submits that a person who was brought to the United States
as a child, who has made the United States his or her home for the extent of
their formative life, who may never have acquired the language of the origin
country, and who is—for all substantive purposes a de facto national—has
those special ties. Clearly, in cases where a person did not even realize that
he or she was not a U.S. citizen due to their high level of integration, there
are sufficient ties. Closer cases involve persons who might still understand
the language of the origin state, who may have travelled to or resided in the
origin state for substantial periods, and who were otherwise exercising rights
they derived from their nationality in the origin state. Those persons have a
harder claim to make that they have established the necessary special ties.
c. Arbitrary Expulsion
The next question is whether the deportation of persons with special ties
would be so arbitrary such that the expulsion would be unlawful under
international law. The rights in the ICCPR to remain in one’s own country

“stay, but not as citizens”); Quinnipiac University Poll Sept. 21–26, 2017, POLLINGREPORT.COM,
http://www.pollingreport.com/immigration.htm (last visisted Mar. 26, 2019) (seventy-six percent “support”
granting Dreamers legal status and work permits).
177
See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 8, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
178
See generally Jawad Fairooz, Opening Comments, in SEMINAR, ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF
CITIZENSHIP, SEMINAR 7, 7 (Oct. 31 2016).
179
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 176, art. 3.
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can be abridged by the state, provided the state does not act arbitrarily.180
That being said, the Human Rights Committee has held that instances in
which an individual may be deprived of the right to return to one’s own
country are few.181
Arbitrariness has both procedural182 and substantive183 aspects under
international law, so acts of deportation must generally conform to the rule
of law.184 Procedurally, the act at issue must have been prescribed by law185
and comport with basic notions of predictability.186 This aspect generally
prevents states from acting contrary to their own laws. Procedural
arbitrariness could also include mass expulsions where there was no
individualized assessment of qualification.187 Another possibility is where it
violates human rights, provided there is a fair and individualized assessment
of each person’s circumstances to evaluate, for example, claims of right to
remain or non-refoulment.188
Substantively, the act must be reasonable.189 Under this requirement,
measures by states must not be discriminatory on prohibited grounds190 or
wildly out of proportion to the problem they seek to address.191 This Article
does not address whether removal of Dreamers is discriminatory, although
the reader is invited to make his or her own conclusions on that point. In
determining whether a measure is disproportionate, the act must serve some

180

See ICCPR, supra note 133, art. 26.
See Gen. Comm. No. 27, supra note 130, ¶ 21.
182
See U.N. Secretary-General, Arbitrary deprivation of nationality, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/34 (Jan.
26, 2009) [hereinafter Arbitrary Deprivation]; see generally Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, ¶ 95 (Feb. 6, 2011).
183
See Arbitrary Deprivation, supra note 181.
184
See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 15, ¶ 128 (July 20, 1989).
185
See Gen. Comm. No. 15, supra note 154, ¶¶ 8, 10; see Eritrea v. Ethiopia, 26 R.I.A.A. 195, 198, Partial
Award, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004).
186
See Hugo van Alphen v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 305/1988, ¶ 5(8), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (1990).
187
See Gen. Comm. No. 15, supra note 154, ¶ 10.
188
See Becker v. Denmark, App. No. 7011/75, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 215 (1975) (defining a
prohibited collective expulsion of aliens as “any measure of the competent authority compelling aliens as a group
to leave the country except where such a measure is taken after and on the basis of a reasonable and objective
examination of the particular cases of each individual alien of the group”).
189
See Gen. Comm. No. 27, supra note 130; see U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR Views
under article 5 at 21–22, CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 (Dec. 16, 1996) [hereinafter CCPR Views Art. 5].
190
See CERD, supra 150, art. 5(d)(iii); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) art. 9(1), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
191
See Arbitrary Deprivation, supra note 181, ¶ 49; Gen. Comm. No. 27, supra note 130; CCPR Views
Art. 5, supra note 188.
181
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legitimate purpose192 and be the least intrusive way to achieve the legitimate
result.193
The deportation of Dreamers could be both procedurally and
substantively arbitrary. From a procedural perspective, the withdrawal of the
policy, on which DACA recipients have relied, is hardly predictable. The
granting of DACA status and then rescission could violate the recipients’
legitimate expectations on regularized status. Thus, pushing them back into
irregular status, now with records of their presence, could be viewed as
procedurally arbitrary. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
agreed that the termination of DACA was arbitrary.194 From a substantive
perspective, there needs to be strong justification for the removal and a
proportionate response. It is unclear what has changed to make the previous
decision that these persons were of low priority now more compelling,
especially considering the remarks of the DHS Secretary confirming that
DACA recipients were not a high priority.195 One condition of participation
in the DACA program is that persons cannot have a significant criminal
records,196 so it would be difficult to justify removal as a safety issue.
However, if the removals were only of persons who came to the attention of
law enforcement, there might be an argument that those individuals could be
removed. Given the views of the Human Rights Committee that few
derogations would be justifiable, it is difficult to see how there is a
compelling government interest in removal of these persons specifically.197

192
See Eritrea v. Ethiopia, 26 R.I.A.A. 195, 220, Partial Award, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004); Stewart v. Canada,
supra note 151; U.N. Secretary-General, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality, ¶ 4, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/25/28 (Dec. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Arbitrary Deprivation II]; European Commission for
Democracy Through Law, Opinion on the Draft Constitutional Law on “Protection of the Nation” of
France, ¶¶ 25, 47, Doc. CDL-AD(2016)006 (Mar. 14, 2016).
193
See Arbitrary Deprivation II, supra note 191.
194
See Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 215–16 (“The Court further concludes that, under the APA, DACA’s
rescission was arbitrary and capricious because the Department failed adequately to explain its conclusion that
the program was unlawful. Neither the meager legal reasoning nor the assessment of litigation risk provided by
DHS to support its rescission decision is sufficient to sustain termination of the DACA program.”).
195
See Carlos Ballesteros, What Happens If DACA Ends? Deporting Dreamers Won’t Be a Priority,
Homeland
Secretary Says, NEWSWEEK, (Jan. 16, 2018, 11:42 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/what-happens-if-dacaends-dreamers-deported-homeland-782290 (“Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen insisted Tuesday
that federal agencies will not prioritize deporting immigrants brought illegally into the United States as children
. . . these immigrants will remain a low priority ‘in perpetuity,’ but noted that if any of them commit a crime,
‘we will enforce the law.’”).
196
See Consideration of DACA, supra note 11.
197
See Gen. Comm. No. 27, supra note 130, ¶ 21 (“[T]here are few, if any, circumstances in which
deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country could be reasonable.”).
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d. Mens rea
Having established that the deportation of Dreamers could satisfy the
actus reus of deportation, we finally turn to the mens rea. The mens rea
requirement is that the person act with the intent to remove the individuals
across a border with the knowledge that the removal forms part of a
widespread or systematic attack.198 As for the first part, the intent to remove,
what remains contested is whether this intent must include the intent to
permanently remove the individuals from the state.199 The dominant view
from the ICTY is that the intent need not be for permanent removal, only
removal in that instant,200 across a border.201 In keeping with the contextual
element, the second part of the mens rea is that the perpetrator must also
have the knowledge that the expulsion would form part of the widespread or
systematic attack.202 In the case of the Dreamers, both parts of this element
will not be difficult to establish. Clearly, the effort is intended to remove the
individuals from the United States. As long as the perpetrator also held the
intent to participate in a larger, coordinated policy of removing these
persons, then they would also intent to take part in a widespread and
systematic practice. Provided that the individual that contributes to this
offense holds the requisite mens rea, then that person could be charged with
that crime.

198
See Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 601 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005); Brđanin, supra note 91, ¶ 545; Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 134; Naletilić &
Martinović, supra note 91, ¶ 520; Krnojelac, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg, supra note 91, ¶ 16 .
199
See Popopvić, supra note 94, ¶ 905; Brđanin, supra note 91, ¶ 206; Stakić, supra note 111, ¶¶ 278,
304–05, 307, 317; Blagojević & Jokić, supra note 197, ¶ 601; Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at ¶ 545; Simić et
al., supra note 91, ¶¶ 132–34; Naletilić & Martinović, supra note 91, ¶ 520; Krnojelac, Separate Opinion of
Judge Schomburg, supra note 91, ¶ 16; JEAN S. PICTET, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY VI,
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 277–83 (1958).
200
See Prosecutor v. Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 57–58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013); Popopvić, Case No. IT-05-88-T, at ¶ 904; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik,
Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgment, ¶ 304 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 2009);
Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, ¶ 164 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009); Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, at ¶ 206; Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, at
¶¶ 307, 317; Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, at ¶ 687.
201
See Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-T, at ¶ 58; Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, at ¶ 164; Popopvić, Case
No. IT-05-88-T, at ¶ 904; Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, at ¶¶ 278, 300, 307, 317.
202
See Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 313–14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2008); Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A,
Judgment, ¶ 85 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).
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Lastly, there has to be a nexus both of action and knowledge between the
widespread or systematic attack203 and the wrongful act of the accused.204
The nexus can be established by considering the nature of the charged
offense, its aims, and the consequences.205 Acts that are clearly different or
isolated cannot form part of the widespread or systematic attack.206 In
addition, the Court must find that the accused participated in the widespread
or systematic attack knowingly.207 This requirement does not mean that the
individual knew all the details of the policy, or even that he or she shared the
intent of the state or organization. It only means that the accused had
knowledge that his or her acts would form part of the widespread or systemic
attack.208
This final question will depend on the precise behavior of any accused
who participates in the removal of Dreamers. Surely an immigration
enforcement agent’s actions would qualify where the officer was discharging
his or her mandate to detain, with knowledge that these actions formed part
of the overall policy and plan to remove Dreamers. Officers and agents at
higher levels within the hierarchy might also share responsibility where they
substantially contribute to the deportations and, again, know that they do so
as part of the national policy.
e. Justifications for Deportation
Notwithstanding the above, there are some cases where the forced
expulsion of persons is permitted, and the action is not a crime.209 People
may be evacuated from situations of massive humanitarian crisis or armed
203
See Elements of Crimes, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(d)(4); Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur), First
report on crimes against humanity, ¶¶ 151–52, UN Doc. A/CN.4/680 (Feb. 17, 2015) [hereinafter First Report
on Crimes Against Humanity].
204
See Elements of Crimes, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(d)(5) (“The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part
of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population”);
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment, ¶ 1099 (Mar. 7, 2014).
205
See Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 866 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for Rwanda Dec. 1, 2003); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 326 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda May 15, 2003); Kunarać, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, at ¶ 99; Prosecutor v.
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 271–72 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
206
See Katanga, supra note 64, ¶ 1124.
207
See id., ¶ 1125; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 99 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, supra note 59, ¶ 124; Prosecutor v.
Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 332 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda May 15, 2003);
Kunarać, supra note 57, ¶ 103; First Report on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 203, ¶ 157.
208
See Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 313–14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2008); Kunarać, supra note 57, ¶ 85.
209
See First Report on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 203, ¶ 157.
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conflict210 for their security due to imperative military reasons,211 or even
epidemics or natural disasters,212 provided that the evacuated persons are
returned home as soon as possible.213 Of course, if the crisis is the fault of
the state that wishes to expel the persons, then the exception is not
applicable.214 In addition, just having assistance from or participation of
ICRC or other humanitarian agencies or peacekeepers, whether under the
terms of a formal return or exchange agreement, does not make an unlawful
removal become lawful.215 After all, “[m]ilitary commanders or political
leaders cannot consent on behalf of the individual.”216 Thus this exception
does not go to the consensual aspect of the forcible removal, but goes to the
military necessity of the removal. In the case of the Dreamers, none of these
exceptions appear to apply. Even if Mexico, or any other state in which they
might have nationality, were to accept them and cooperate with the
expulsion, the removal would not be made lawful by that act.
CONCLUSION
This Article questioned whether the expulsion of the Dreamers,
beneficiaries of the DACA policy, would constitute the crime against

210
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 19, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 49;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 17, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol
II].
211
See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 210, art. 19; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art.
49; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts art. 57(1–2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol
I]; Additional Protocol II, supra note 210, art. 17; Prlić, supra note 91, ¶ 52; Popopvić et al., supra note 94,
¶ 901; Stakić, supra note 111,¶¶ 284, 287; Blagojević & Jokić, supra note 197,¶ 598; Krstić, supra note 91,
¶¶ 524, 526; see, e.g., United States v. List (“Hostages Trial”) 8 LRTWC 69 (U.S. Mil. Trib., 1948); GC IV
COMMENTARY, supra note 94, at 280; AP COMMENTARY, supra note 136, at 1473.
212
See Popopvić et al., supra note 94, ¶ 903; Krajišnik, supra note 64, ¶ 308, fn.739; Stakić, supra note
111, ¶ 287; Blagojević & Jokić, supra note 197, ¶ 600; AP COMMENTARY, supra note 136, at 1473.
213
See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 49(2); Stakić, supra note 111,¶ 284; Popopvić et
al., supra note 94, ¶ 901; GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 94, at 280.
214
Prlić, supra note 91, ¶ 53 (where the exception is not applicable); Popopvić et al., supra note 94, ¶ 903;
Krajišnik, supra note 60,¶ 308, fn.739; Stakić, supra note 111,¶ 287; Vincent Chetail, Is There Any Blood on
My Hands? Deportation as a Crime of International Law, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 917, 925; see Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 37, art. 49; Additional Protocol II, supra note 210, art. 17.
215
See Prlić, supra note 91, ¶ 54; Popopvić et al., supra note 94, ¶; Stakić, supra note 111, ¶ 286;
Prosecutor v. Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 127; Naletilić & Martinović, supra note 91, ¶ 523 (explaining that
agreements between military commanders does not make the transfer lawful).
216
See Popopvić et al., supra note 94, ¶ 897; Simić et al., supra note 91, ¶ 127; Stakić, supra note 60,
¶ 683.
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humanity of deportation.217 Any individual who effects a widespread and
systemic removal of people from their lawful homes commits that crime
under international law. This Article has argued that the qualifying victims
of the crime against humanity of deportation can include aliens, even aliens
unlawfully present under domestic law, provided that they have special ties
to the state. The requirement of lawful residence for purposes of the crime
of deportation determines residence under international law, not domestic
law. While states generally have the right to expel unlawfully present aliens
from their territory, they cannot—under international human rights law—
expel aliens who have special ties with the state, even if the state considers
those persons unlawfully present under domestic law. Dreamers have lived
the bulk of their lives in the United States and many do not even realize that
they are not U.S. citizens. Certainly, they have special ties to the state that
are far more significant that the ties of a mere alien. Therefore, these people
are lawfully present for purposes of international law, and their mass
expulsion from their lawful homes would amount to the crime against
humanity of deportation by the individuals that carry out any expulsion.

217
This Article does not address the more than 250,000 individuals who are losing Temporary
Protected status (TPS), although a similar argument might be made. It is somewhat more challenging to
sustain the argument that they have special ties to the degree that Dreamers do, though more than 50,000
of them have been residents in the United States since 1999. See Nick Miroff, Trump Administration Ends
Protections for 50,000 Hondurans Living in U.S. Since 1999, WASH. POST (May 4, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-will-end-protections-for50000-hondurans-living-in-us-since-1999/2018/05/04/c05c7676-4fc1-11e8-b966-bfb0da2dad62_story.html?
utm_term=.a12d6c57e4cf.

